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Torts
BY DAVID P. GRISE*
INTRODUCTION
During the Survey year,' Kentucky courts decided several
significant cases addressing various aspects of tort law. The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court narrowed the applicability of the doctrine
of parental immunity2 and upheld a special limitations statute for
improvements to real property.3 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
rejected the federal rule governing executive privileges from li-
ability for defamation 4 and found threats to employment insuffi-
cient to give rise to a claim of false imprisonment. 5 In an unpub-
lished opinion, the court of appeals limited the effect of the im-
putation of a parent's negligence to a child in wrongful death ac-
tions.6 This Survey places these decisions in context and analyzes
the logic upon which they were based.
. J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1983. The author expresses his indebted-
ness to Professor Richard C. Ausness for his advice on the topics addressed in this Survey.
1 The Survey period roughly covers the period of July 1, 1981, through June 30,
1982. One significant defamation case during this time, McCall v. Courier-Journal &
Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1981) (per curiam), is discussed in Mobley,
Torts, 70 Ky. L.J. 527 (1981-82).
Other cases of interest decided during the year but not addressed in this Survey in-
clude: Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (damages for negligent
performance of vasectomy limited to damages incidental to pregnancy such as medical ex-
penses, pain, loss of consortium and loss of wages); American States Ins. Co. v. Audubon
Country Club, No. 81-CA-859-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 21, 1982), discretionary review
granted, No. -SC- (Ky. Oct. 5, 1982) (jury award of future medical expenses was proper in
absence of award for future pain and suffering); Board of Education v. Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Human Rights Comm'n, 625 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (reasonable
person standard applied to invasion of privacy).
2 Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1982).
3 Ball Homes, Inc. v. Volpert, 633 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1982).
4 Lanier v. Higgins, 623 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Haynes v. McConnell,
642 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
5 Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
6 Carter v. Gilmore & Tatge Mfg. Co., No. 80-CA-1906-MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 10,
1981), discretionary review granted, (Ky. Dec. 8, 1981), dismissed as settled, (Ky. Mar. 3,
1982).
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I. PARENTAL IMMUNITY
Since its creation in 1891, 7 the doctrine of parental immunity
has barred suits between parents and their children for personal
torts.8 The primary justification for the doctrine has been that it
preserves domestic tranquility and parental discipline.9 Also,
courts have feared that allowing tort claims between parents and
their children would lead to a flood of "fraudulent and fictitious"
claims, '0 or that one child might recover an amount large enough
to deplete the family's resources at the expense of other chil-
dren." In the 1950s, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, following a
nationwide trend, began 12 recognizing a series of exceptions to
the immunity doctrine. For example, suits were allowed where
the child had been emancipated's or where one of the parties was
7 The doctrine of parental immunity was created by the Mississippi Supreme Court
in Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). Hewellette, commonly spelled "Hewlett"
by courts, involved a mother's malicious false imprisonment of her daughter in an insane
asylum.
8 See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971); Poling, The Par-
ent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 5 J. Juv. L. 75 (1981); Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1066 (1981).
Courts have always recognized causes of action in contract or property between
parents and children. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at § 122; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 895G comment d (1979). For examples of the tort immunity doctrine's applica-
tion in Kentucky courts, see Redwine v. Adkins, 339 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1960); Harralson v.
Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954) (overruled by Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346
S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961)); Thompson v. Thompson, 264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1954).
9 Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Ky. 1970); W. PROSSER, supra note
8, at § 122; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 8, at § 895G comment c. How-
ever, a desire to sue would indicate that little domestic tranquility remains to be pro-
tected, especially if the tort is in the nature of a brutal battery. See Hollister, Parent-Child
Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 489 (1982).
10 Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d at 403. Is not the potential for fraud as great in
actions involving siblings or friends where no immunity applies as in actions between par-
ent and child? Holding that the risk of "precisely the same" is Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8,
12 (Alaska 1967) (quoting Badigian v. Badigian, 174 N.E.2d 718, 723 (N.Y. 1961) (Fuld,
J., dissenting)).
, The policy reasons behind the doctrine of parental immunity are discussed and re-
butted in Comment, The Demise of Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 12 WILLAMEtrE L.J.
605 (1975-76).
12 In Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953), the Court made its first assault
on general family immunity by permitting a wife to sue her husband in tort for the negli-
gent operation of their automobile.
" Thompson v. Thompson, 264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1954). The emancipation required
was more than the parent's mere renunciation pf the child's services and earnings. It had
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deceased 14 because no family relationship remained to be dis-
rupted by the action.
Finally, in the 1970 case of Rigdon v. Rigdon, 15 Kentucky
joined most other states in abrogating the doctrine of parental
immunity in all but two circumstances: (1) Where the negligent
act involves the reasonable exercise of parental authority, 16 and
(2) where the negligent act involves the exercise of ordinary pa-
rental discretion with respect to provisions for care and necessi-
ties of the child.Y The language used in Rigdon and the recog-
to be a "complete severance of the filial tie, and an entire surrender of care and custody of
the child, as well as renunciation of parental duties." Id. at 668. See also Carricato v. Car-
ricato, 384 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1964) (citing Thompson and other cases and stating that
"the intention of the parent governs").
14 Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d at 402 (child allowed to sue estate of deceased
parent); Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Ky. 1961) ("The rule of nonli-
ability is based upon a public policy to protect from disruption a family relationship. This
evil is removed by the death of the child."); Hale v. Hale, 230 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1950) (ad-
ministrator of deceased child's estate allowed to sue parent).
A common exception to the doctrine found in other states is where the parent's
conduct constituted willful misconduct. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal.
1955); Wright v. Wright, 70 S.E.2d 152 (Ca. Ct. App. 1952); Cowgill v. Boock, 218 P.2d
445 (Ore. 1950). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORS, supra note 8, at § 895G
comment e. Another common exception is when the parent was engaged in employment
activities at the time the act was committed. See, e.g., Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743
(Ohio 1952); Borst v. Borst, 251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952).
15 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971). Rigdon was an action brought by a minor against his
mother for injuries sustained in an automoble collision.
" The application of this standard has been somewhat inconsistent due to the lack of
a precise definition of "parental authority." In states which have adopted this language,
the courts in the following cases found that the negligent act in controversy did not involve
the exercise of parental authority: Convery v. Maczka, 394 A.2d 1250 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1978) (failure to supervise child who jumped from chair); Gross v. Sears Roe-
buck & Co., 386 A.2d 442 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (negligent operation of lawn
mower); Howes v. Hansen, 201 N.W.2d 825 (Wis. 1972) (failure to supervise child near
sibling operating lawn mower). Compare these to the following cases finding an exercise
of parental authority that warranted applying immunity: Hush v. Devilbiss, 259 N.W.2d
170 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (failure to instruct and supervise child who spilled vaporizer);
Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 233 N.W.2d 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (failure to instruct child
who fell into manhole); Fritz v. Anderson, 371 A.2d 833 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977)
(failure to supervise child who fell into excavation).
17 In Wisconsin, the state which originally adopted this language, the following
cases found no exercise of parental discretion: Schmidt v. U.S., 369 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.
Wis. 1974) (mother's negligent operation of car while driving children home from school);
Thoreson v. Milwaukee Suburban Transp. Co., 201 N.W.2d 745 (Wis. 1972) (three-year-
old allowed to run into busy street); Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 177 N.W.2d 866 (Wis.
1970) (child allowed to play on display swingset). Compare these to Lemmen v. Servais,
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nized exceptions were borrowed from the 1963 Wisconsin case,
Goller v. White,8 which began the nationwide trend towards
abolishing parental immunity. The Goller court, noting that
Wisconsin's earlier abolition of spousal immunity had not dis-
rupted family relations, abrogated the parental immunity doc-
trine on the ground that the prevalence of liability insurance
tended to negate any possible family disruption or depletion of
resources caused by intra-family suits.'9 If a parent is insured, the
elimination of parental immunity will merely allow the child to
be compensated for injuries because the parent's insurance com-
pany has become the real party in interest. However, this reason-
ing presents two problems. First, not all parent-defendants will
be insured. Second, the law generally questions the relevance of
insurance coverage to the merits of a claim or the culpability of
behavior. 2° Regardless of these considerations, however, the pop-
ularity of liability insurance has at least decreased the potential
for intra-family conflicts.
In 1982, in Horn v. Horn,2' the Kentucky Supreme Court
had an opportunity to interpret the Rigdon exceptions. Horn
arose from an accident in which 15-year-old Todd Horn was
seriously injured when a truck collided with the motorbike he
was riding. After Todd and his father completed some farm work
the night of the accident, Todd rode his off-the-road motorbike
on a two-lane highway to their home. His father, in the family
truck, followed closely behind to protect Todd from oncoming
traffic. The driver of a truck which had approached from the
rear was unable to see Todd or his motorbike around the father's
truck. The approaching truck pulled into the left lane to pass the
father's truck just as Todd began his left turn into the driveway
of his home. The two vehicles collided at that point.
Todd's mother filed suit on his behalf against the driver of
the other truck for negligence and against Todd's father for negli-
158 N.W.2d 341 (Wis. 1968), in which failure to instruct a child as to how to safely get off
a school bus was held to involve parental discretion.
18 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
19 Id. at 196-97.
20 See, e.g., FED. R. Evw. 411, declaring that the presence of liability insurance is ir-
relevant upon the issues of negligence and culpable conduct.
21 630 S.W.2d at 70.
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gently allowing his minor son to ride his unlicensed and ill-
equipped motorbike on the public highway. After a settlement
was reached with the truck driver, the circuit court granted
Todd's father's motion for summary judgment on the grounds of
parental immunity.2 This decision was affirmed by the court of
appeals and discretionary review was granted by the Supreme
Court. 23
Mr. Horn argued that both Rigdon exceptions applied, as-
serting that Todd's presence on the highway was the result of
both parental authority and discretion. 4 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected the argument. Instead, it interpreted the Rig-
don exceptions narrowly. Once again adopting the language of
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the Court stated:
An exercise of parental authority simply involves acts of disci-
plining a child while an exercise of discretion in providing for
the care and necessities of a child is limited to those provisions
which a parent is legally obligated to furnish .... To accept
a broader definition would virtually restore parental immunity
to its pre-Rigdon status.21
The Court held that Mr. Horn was not entitled to the protection
of parental immunity, finding that allowing Todd to ride on the
highway involved neither discipline nor a legal obligation. 26 The
Horn holding greatly restricts the scope of parental immunity
since it will apply only in cases involving a parent's "disciplining"
a child or involving a parent's provision of the essential care he or
she is "legally obligated" to furnish a child. However, whether
"parental authority" is exercised only in acts of discipline and
' Id. at 71.2 3 Id.
24 Id. at72.
2 Id. (citation omitted). The Court's citation was to Thoreson v. Milwaukee Sub-
urban Transp. Co., 201 N.W.2d at 753. In Thoreson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court de-
clined to apply parental immunity to a mother who had failed to educate and supervise a
three-year-old who ran into the street.
2 630 S.W.2d at 72. Justices Stephens and Stephenson filed separate dissents. Both
justices favored reinstating the doctrine of parental immunity as it was prior to the Rigdon
decision. Justice Stephens concluded that Mr. Horn's direction to Todd to ride his motor-
bike was an exercise of parental authority. Id. at 73 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
TORTS
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whether "care and necessities of a child" are limited to legal obli-
gations of a parent will likely remain a matter of some debate.-'
The Court's assertion that accepting "a broader definition [of
the exceptions] would virtually restore parental immunity to its
pre-Rigdon status" is questionable. Although the inconsistency
among courts applying the Goller exceptions indicates a need for
more clearly defined standards,s those standards need not be as
restrictive as those expressed by the Kentucky court in Horn. For
example, "parental authority" could be held to encompass all
acts done by a child pursuant to a parent's direct command.
Likewise, the "care and necessities" provided a child might in-
clude those things necessary for a child's development beyond the
minimum required by law. Although such enlargements would
have changed the result of the Horn case due to the father's direc-
tion of his son's activities, they would fall far short of the almost
total immunity afforded parents prior to the Rigdon decision.
In the future, Kentucky courts might abolish the doctrine en-
tirely. A minority of jurisdictions, as well as the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, has already taken this step, predicating liabil-
ity upon a "reasonable parent standard."' This approach is pref-
erable to that taken in Horn. The need for any exceptions is ques-
tionable if the presence of liability insurance has indeed under-
mined the basis for the doctrine of parental immunity. Further-
more, an argument can be made that the only areas Horn has left
subject to the doctrine of parental immunty-discipline and the
provision of essential care-are the areas in which it is least ap-
propriate. A child's need for legal protection is greatest in mat-
ters of discipline and essential care because matters of "disci-
27 "The holding in the majority opinion that an exercise of parental authority simply
involves acts of disciplining a child is not realistic and is a real trouble maker for the fu-
ture." Id. at 73 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
2 See notes 16-17 supra for cases applying the Coller exceptions.
29 See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Petersen v. Honolulu, 462
P.2d 1007 (Hawaii 1970); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Rupert v.
Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment k
(1979). See generally Barder & Ingram, The Decline of the Doctrine of Parent-Child Tort
Immunity, 68 ILL. B.J. 596 (1979-80). But see Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560,564 (Idaho
1980) ("The people of Idaho are too diverse and independent to be judged by a common
standard in such a delicate area as the parent-child relationship").
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pline" are often matters of abuse and matters of "essential care"
are often matters of neglect.
Nevertheless, the Kentucky Supreme Court might move in
the opposite direction. The retirement of Chief Justice Palmore,
who joined in the majority opinion in Horn, and the subsequent
elevation of Justice Stephens, whose dissent favored the reinstate-
ment of full parental immunity, to the office of Chief Justice may
foretell a retreat from Horn's limitations on the doctrine.
II. PARENTS' CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: WRONGFUL DEATH
In Carter v. Gilmore Tatge Manufacturing Co., Inc. ,o the
Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the effect of the contrib-
utory negligence of parents on their recovery for the wrongful
death of their child.3' Carter involved the death of a six-year-old
child caused by a fall into a conveyor. The parents' alleged con-
tributory negligence consisted of both their knowledge that the
child was playing near the equipment and their erroneous as-
sumption that, once he was told to return home, he would do so.
Although the decision is significant enough to warrant discussion
here, it is not binding precedent. After the court of appeals deci-
sion, the Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review.
The case was later dismissed as settled, and the Supreme Court
ordered the court of appeals opinion not to be published. Never-
theless, the decision is important because it suggests the possibil-
ity of a significant change in Kentucky's wrongful death law.
Historically, Kentucky courts sought to deter negligence by
barring wrongful death actions brought by the estate of a child
3 0 No. 80-CA-1906-MR.
31 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8 at § 127; 2 R. EADES, WRONGFuL DEATH
ACTIONS-THE LAW IN KENTUCKY (1981); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 585 (1964).
There was no action for wrongful death at common law since any possible action
was held to have died with the injured party. See Eden v. Lexington & Frankfort R.R.
Co., 53 Ky. 204 (1853). However, the present version of the Kentucky Constitution,
adopted in 1891, specifically provides in § 242 for such an action and § 54 precludes the
General Assembly from limiting the amount of recoveries for wrongful death and other
actions.
In Kentucky, contributory negligence has always been held to bar recovery for
wrongful death. See, e.g., Warren's Adm'x v. Jeunesse, 122 S.W. 862 (Ky. 1909); Clark's
Adm'x v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 39 S.W. 840 (Ky. 1897); Passamaneck v. Louisville
Ry. Co., 32 S.W. 620 (Ky. 1895).
TORTS
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when the parents contributed to their child's death.1 This rule
was based upon the notion that, although Kentucky law requires
wrongful death actions to be brought by the deceased's personal
representative,- any recovery is actually for the joint benefit of
the parents because they will receive the award. Later, Kentucky
courts began to allow recovery by an innocent parent despite his
or her spouse's negligence. m However, any award was reduced
by the amount the negligent parent would have recovered.
In 1974, Cox v. Cooper36 followed precedent by allowing a
child's innocent mother to receive one half of the award despite
the negligence of the child's father. However, the court stated
that it might have accepted the position, had the plaintiff argued
it, that the share of a negligent parent's award should pass to
those who would have taken it had he or she been dead.Y
Consistent with this dictum, the court of appeals in Carter
held that contributory negligence of a parent or parents will not
3 ' Both parents were barred by the negligence of one of them since that negligence
was imputed to the other. E.g., Melton v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 436 F.2d 22 (6th
Cir. 1970); Emerine v. Ford, 254 S.W.2d 938 .(Ky. 1953); Wheat's Adm'r v. Gray, 218
S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1949); Brown McClain Transfer Co. v. Major's Adm'r, 65 S.W.2d 992
(Ky. 1933). The only exception to the rule was when only one parent had knowledge that
the child was engaged in an unlawful employment which caused the child's death. See,
e.g., 65 S.W.2d at 994; 218 S.W.2d at 402. Obviously, the negligence of both parents also
would bar a claim. E.g., Acres v. Hall's Adm'r, 253 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1952); Burch v.
Byrd, 246 S.W.2d 595 (Ky. 1952).
3 KY. R V. STAT. § 411.130(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Cur. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as KRS].
3 See, e.g., Louisville v. Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1968); McCallum v.
Harris, 379 S.W.2d 438 (Ky. 1964).
35 See, e.g., 438 S.W.2d at 97; 379 S.W.2d at 444. See generally W. PaossEn, supra
note 8, at § 127. The same result is reached where the defendant is one of the benefi-
ciaries..See, e.g., Hale v. Hale, 230 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1950); Bays v. Cox! Adm'r, 229
S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1950).
Kentucky courts began to allow an innocent parent to recover regardless of his or
her spouse's conduct largely because of its previous rejection of the imputation of negli-
gence between spouses. "A husband and wife may undoubtedly sustain such relations to
each other in a given case that the negligence of one will be imputed to the other. The
mere existence of the marital relation, however, will not have that effect." Louisville By.
'Co. v. McCarthy, 112 S.W. 925,926 (Ky. 1908). See 230 S.W.2d at 612.
3M 510 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1974).
37 Id. at 538. Kentucky's wrongful death statute provides a schedule of recovery
based upon the relationship of the survivors to the deceased. K1S §§ 411.130-.150 (Cur.
Supp. 1982).
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bar a wrongful death action by the estate of a child.- Rather, the
share in the actual award of the tortfeasor parent or parents will
pass to those who would take if the tortfeasor(s) was no longer
living.39
Applying the court's holding to the recovery distribution
scheme under Kentucky's current wrongful death statutes, 0 the
contributory negligence of one parent would merely cause the
entire recovery to pass to the remaining parent. Since the major-
ity of married couples pool their financial resources, treating the
negligent parent as deceased would be tantamount to ignoring
his or her negligence. This result obviously does not further the
policy of preventing a wrongdoer from benefitting from negli-
gent conduct. However, if both parents are found to be contrib-
utorily negligent the recovery becomes part of the child's estate
and passes to other takers according to the laws of descent and
distribution .41
III. DEFAMATION: EXECUTrVE PRIVILEGE
Although a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of def-
amation, a defendant may be relieved of liability through the ap-
plication of an absolute or conditional privilege. Defamation
privileges are based upon the premise that the public's interest in
receiving information and in encouraging uninhibited speech in
some areas outweighs an individual's interest in freedom from
defamation. 42 Communications made by governmental officials
in the performance of their duties is one such area.43
38 No. 80-CA-1906-MR, slip op. at 8. The court did note, however, that some in-
stances of parental negligence might constitute an intervening cause of the child's death
which would supersede the defendant's negligence and relieve him of liability. Id. at 5-6.
39 Id. at 9. This result, the court noted, was consistent with the fact that the contrib-
utory negligence of parents who actually died in the same accident as their child does not
bar an action by the remaining beneficiaries. Id. at 7-8.
40 KRS §§ 411.130-.150 (Cum. Supp. 1982);
41 Id. § 411.130(2)(e).
42 W. POSSER.supra note 8, at § 114; Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 739,741 (1973).
' The privilege only applies to statements made within the scope of the official's
duties. Otherwise, there is no public interest to be protected. For examples of statements
found to be outside of an official's duties, see Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir.
1941) (marshal discussing dismissal of deputies with reporters); Lipman v. Brisbane Ele-
TOnT~s
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The degree of protection from liability for defamation af-
forded an official depends upon whether an absolute or condi-
tional privilege applies. Absolute privileges exclude liability re-
gardless of the conduct of the publisher!4 They traditionally
have been applied only to statements made during the course of
judicial or legislative proceedings or those made by executive of-
ficials in the discharge of their duties. 45 Conditional privileges
protect a publisher only when he or she acts without malice or
abuse. 40 That is, one covered by a conditional privilege will be
protected only if the publication was made in a reasonable man-
ner, for a proper purpose and without knowledge of the state-
ment's falsity.47 Courts generally apply conditional privileges to
statements made to protect the legally recognized interests of the
publisher, a third party or the public. 4
Although all American courts provide some form of privilege
for governmental officials, they disagree as to the proper applica-
tion of absolute or conditional privileges.49 During the Survey
year, the Kentucky Court of Appeals rendered two decisions clar-
ifying Kentucky's position on this issue and, in the process, re-
jected the application of absolute privilege favored by federal
courts.
mentary School Dist., 359 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1961) (school trustee's statements to reporter);
Cheatum v. Wehle, 159 N.E.2d 166 (N.Y. 1959) (after dinner speech by state conservation
commissioner).
44 In Ranson v. West, 101 S.W. 885, 886 (Ky. 1907) the Court explained that one
class of privileged communications is "[c]ases absolutely privileged, so that no action will
lie, even though it be averred that the injurious publication was both false and malicious."
45 See, e.g., Hayes v. Rodgers, 447 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1969). The consent of the plain-
tiff also confers an absolute privilege. W. PaossER, supra note 8, at § 114.
46 The Court in Ranson, 101 S.W. at 886, described this kind of privilege as follows:
"Cases privileged, but only to this extent: That the circumstances are held to preclude any
presumption of malice, but still leave the party responsible if both falsehood and malice
are affirmatively shown."
47 See, e.g., Baker v. Clark, 218 S.W. 280 (Ky. 1920).48 W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at § 115. See Dossett v. New York Mining and Mfg.,
451 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1970); Baskettv. Crossfield, 228 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Ky. 1921).
49 Compare Stewart v. Williams, 218 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. 1949), with Densmore v.
Boca Raton, 368 So. 2d 945 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (city managers); and Tanner v.
Stevenson, 128 S.W. 878 (Ky. 1910), with McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 253 N.E.2d 85 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1969) (school superintendents). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§§ 591, 589A (1977).
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When Louisville Police Chief5O Jon Higgins was asked during
a television interview 5' about race relations within his depart-
ment, he responded that one officer, Shelby Lanier, was "per-
haps the worst racist in the Louisville Division of Police." He fur-
ther stated that officer Lanier had "done more to forment [sic]
distrust and unrest in the department between officers and in the
black community than any other single officer" and that Lanier
"has never allowed fact or truth to stand in the way of a good
protest or a ridiculous statement." He concluded, "it's a shame
Shelby Lanier should wear a badge."52 Not surprisingly, these re-
marks caught officer Lanier's attention, and he instituted an ac-
tion for slander against both Higgins and the City of Louisville.-"
At the trial, Police Chief Higgins was granted summary judg-
ment on the ground that he enjoyed an absolute privilege against
defamation liability in all of his official acts.," In granting sum-
mary judgment, the trial court relied heavily upon the federal
approach to official privileges laid down in Barr v. Matteo. s In
50 Other defamation cases concerning police officers include: Wardlow v. Miami,
372 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 403 So. 2d 414, modified, 404 So. 2d 1126
(Fla. 1981) (lieutenant qualifiedly privileged in giving evaluation of former officer to
another police department); Catron v. Jasper, 198 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1946) (police officer
absolutely privileged in communications with other officer engaged in enforcement);
Manning v. McAlister, 454 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1970) (police chief and sergeant giving
reasons for officers dismissal upon inquiry were qualifiedly privileged); Krause v. Dris-
coll, 78 Pa. D. & C. 72 (1951) (captain absolutely privileged in statement about officer to
civil service commission); Elder v. Holland, 155 S.E.2d 369 (Va. 1967) (police superinten-
dent conditionally privileged to repeat libel at hearing).
51 See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 739 (1973), for cases concerning the statements
of employers to the news media.
52 The defamatory remarks are recorded in Lanier v. Higgins, 623 S.W.2d 914 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1981).
53 623 S.W.2d at 914. The City of Louisville was dismissed from the appeal because
It had not been properly named in the notice of appeal. Id. at 914 n.1.
M Id. at 914. At first blush, one must wonder whether pointing a finger at a partic-
ular officer during a television interview is within the scope of the duties of a chief of po-
lice. However, the Louisville Police Procedural Manual states that the commanding offi-
cer has responsibility for responding to "legitimate news inquiries." Id. at 916.
W 360 U.S. 564 (1959). See Handler & Klein, Defense of Privilege in Defamation
Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 44 (1960); Note, Abso-
lute Privilege in Defamation: The Extension by Barr v. Mateo, 21 U. hir. L. REv 41
(1959); Comment, Extension of Absolute Privilege to Executive Officers of Government
Agencies, 20 MD. L. REv. 368 (1960).
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Barr, two former employees of the Federal Department of Rent
Stabilization sued the director of that agency for statements
made in a press release concerning their dismissal. The United
States Supreme Court found the statements absolutely privileged
as an official act within the scope of the director's duties.56
Rather than restricting the application of executive privilege to
high ranking officials, the Court held that the privilege applied
to all federal government employees.
The complexities and magnitude of governmental activity
have become so great that there must of necessity be a delega-
tion of authority as to many functions, and we cannot say that
these functions become less important simply because they are
exercised by officers of lower rank in the executive hierarchy. 57
The rationale behind this conclusion was the need to shield "re-
sponsible governmental officials against the harrassment and in-
evitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits" that
would "consume time and energies which would otherwise be
devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might
appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective adminis-
tration of policies of government."5
In Lanier v. Higgins,59 the Kentucky Court of Appeals re-
jected the federal approach,6 holding that Chief Higgins was
covered by a conditional privilege only.61 This holding was the
56 360 U.S. at 574.
5 Id. at 573. For other cases applying the federal rule, see Howard v. Lyons, 360
U.S. 593 (1959); Heine v. Bans, 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Kelly, 364 F.2d
113 (10th Cir. 1966); Taylor v. Glotfelty, 201 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1952). For.state cases
applying the federal rationale, see Cheatum v. Wehle, 159 N.E.2d at 166; Long v. Mertz,
407 P.2d 404 (Ariz. App. 1965). But see Martinez v. Cardwell, 542 P.2d 1133 (Ariz. App.
1975).
M 360 U.S. at 565, 571.
'9 623 S.W.2d at 914.
60 "While we accord the greatest respect to decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, we are faced with a question of state law, and it is to the judicial decisions of this
Commonwealth which we must look to to determine the limits of the defense of absolute
immunity." Id. at 914-15.
61 Id. at 916. Decisions from other states applying conditional rather than absolute
privileges include: Vigoda v. Barton, 204 N.E.2d 441 (Mass. 1965) (hospital superinten-
dent); Howland v. Flood, 36 N.E. 482 (Mass. 1894) (town committee member); Raymond
v. Croll, 206 N.W. 556 (Mich. 1925) (budget director); Mullens v. Davidson, 57 S.E.2d 1
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product of the court's determination that an individual's interest
in freedom from defamation and the public's interest in the ac-
curacy of government information were more compelling than
the public's interest in the unfettered exercise of governmental
functions.62 Combining its reasoning in Higgins with previous
Kentucky case law,6 the court announced this rule: All commu-
nications of governmental officials which are within the scope of
their duties are conditionally privileged unless the situation
clothes the officer with an absolute privilege. 4 Absolute priv-
ileges are applied to communications made: (1) by the heads of
executive departments;6 (2) during judicial or legislative pro-
ceedings;O (3) in the course of military affairs;67 (4) during a
quasi-judicial administrative proceeding;6s (5) in the discharge of
a specific statutory duty," or (6) between officers in the course of
performing their similar duties. 7° Although this position is more
restrictive than the federal rule concerning application of abso-
(W. Va. 1949) (police officer); Ranous v. Hughes, 141 N.W.2d 251 (Wis. 1966) (school
board member). Compare these to the absolute privileges found in: Grande v. State, 565
P.2d 900 (Ariz. App. 1977) (tax commissioner); Saroyan v. Burkett, 371 P.2d 293 (Cal.
1962) (superintendent of banks); Roberts v. Lenfesty, 264 So. 2d 449 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App.
1972) (junior college president); Adams v. Tatsch, 362 P.2d 984 (N.M. 1961) (highway
commissioner); Duffy v. Kippers, 271 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1966) (town supervisor).
62 623 S.W.2d at 916.
6 The Higgins court cited the following cases: Jacobs v. Underwood, 484 S.W.2d
855 (Ky. 1972); Catron v. Jasper, 198 S.W.2d (Ky. 1946); Begley v. Louisville Times Co.,
115 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1938); McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 284 S.W. 88 (Ky. 1926); Tanner
v. Stevenson, 128 S.W. 878 (Ky. 1910).
' This portion of the rule is consistent with the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToaTs S
598A (1977): "An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if an inferior ad-
ministrative officer 9f a state or any of its subdivisions who is not entitled to an absolute
privilege makes a defamatory communication required or permitted in the performance of
his official duties."
However, Kentucky law makes a "required" defamatory statement absolutely
privileged when it is made in the discharge of statutory duty. McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins,
284 S.W. at 91.
6 Tanner v. Stevenson, 128 S.W. at 878.
6 Sebree v. Thompson, 103 S.W. 374 (Ky. 1907) (judicial); Jacobs v. Underwood,
484 S.W.2d at 855 (legislative). Ky. CONST. § 43 gives members of the General Assembly
protection from defamation liability"for any speech or debate in either house."
67 Begley v. Louisville Times Co., 115 S.W.2d at 345.
6 McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 284 S.W. at 88.
s9Id.
70 Catron v. Jasper, 198 S.W.2d at 322.
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lute privileges, it is consistent with the position of a majority of
the states. 7
1
The Higgins decision was cited as authority for disposing of a
privilege issue in a subsequent defamation case, Haynes v.
McConnell.72 Haynes was the coordinator of a federally funded
plea negotiation program conducted within the Jefferson Circuit
Court. McConnell, the county judge executive of Jefferson
County, sent copies of a letter he had written to the chief judge of
the Jefferson Circuit Court to all of the judges within the circuit.
The letter revealed that Haynes had several large outstanding
debts and, based upon these debts, concluded: "You, of course,
know better than I the extreme sensitivity of the position as it re-
lates to the subject of plea negotiation with criminal defendants.
The aforestated facts present a real, or perceived, vulnerability
to the individual occupying this position."73
Upon learning of these statements, Haynes brought an action
alleging that they were defamatory in that they created the im-
pression that he was vulnerable to accepting bribes or misusing
public funds.74 The trial court, however, granted defendant Mc-
Connell's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, as
the county judge was acting within the scope of his official
duties, he was clothed with an absolute privilege. 75
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the trial
court's application of absolute privilege was erroneous. 76 Citing
Higgins, the court stated that application of absolute privilege
was limited to heads of state rather than local departments.77 De-
spite this interpretation, the court ruled in favor of the defen-
dant, accepting the argument that his statements were opinions
71 See note 61 supra for representative cases.
72 642 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
73 Id. at 902-03. See generally Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 492 (1969) (public officer's priv-
ilege as to statements made concerning hiring and firing); Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 8 (1953)
(actionability of statements imputing inefficiency or misconduct to public employee).
74 642 S.W.2d at 903.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. Of course, the statement of a local department head would be absolutely priv-
ileged if it fell within any of the other categories recognized by Lanier v. Higgins. See text
accompanying notes 65-70 supra for a listing of these categories.
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on a matter of public concern based upon fully disclosed facts
and, therefore, not actionable.78
Although the Haynes court rejected McConnell's reliance on
the Restatement79 as support for his assertion that the defamation
was a nonactionable opinion, it accepted the principle of Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc. 0 as commanding the same result. In
Gertz, the United States Supreme Court viewed the first amend-
ment as protecting the pure expression of opinion from defama-
tion actions. Specifically, the Haynes court found this dicta from
Gertz persuasive: "Under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea. However, [sic] pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."' Defendant
McConnell's statements contained only facts that were admitted-
ly true; his opinion did not imply the existence of any other facts.
Therefore, the statements were constitutionally protected and
could not form the basis of a defamation action. The court's
holding is grounded in common sense as well as constitutional
propriety. When the true facts upon which an opinion is based
are revealed the audience is able to accept or reject the opinion
78 Id.
79 The defendant asserted that RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) af-
forded him an absolute privilege. That section reads: "A defamatory communication may
consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable
only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opin-
ion."
The RmSTATEMENT would protect expressions of opinion "no matter how unjusti-
fied and unreasonable or how derogatory it is." Id. comment c.
80 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, an attorney representing the family of an individ-
ual killed by a Chicago policeman brought a defamation suit against the publisher of a
John Birch Society Publication for referring to him as a "Leninist" and a "communist
fronter" and for implying that he was involved in a plot to undermine American law en-
forcement agencies.
The Gertz decision is among the progeny of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), the landmark case finding that the first amendment restricted the application
of state defamation law.
81 418 U.S. at 339-40. Cases applying Gertz to extend absolute constitutional protec-
tion to opinions based completely upon disclosed facts include: AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264 (1974); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 960 (1979); Rinaldi v. Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1299 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
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according to its own assessment of the facts.82
IV. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
False imprisonment is defined by Kentucky courts as any
deprivation of the liberty of a person by another, for however
short a time, without consent and against that person's will. 13
This detention is actionable only when it is accomplished
through the use of "force." To effect an imprisonment, this force
must compel the plaintiff to either go where he or she does not
wish to go or to stay where he or she does not wish to stay.84 The
force may take the form of any acts, gestures or verbal threats
which overcome the -plaintiffs will.85 However, mere submission
to the verbal directions of another will not constitute false im-
prisonment unless they are accompanied by actual physical force
or threats of actual physical force. 86
Early Kentucky decisions recognized only force directed
against the person as sufficient to effect an imprisonment. Twen-
tieth century decisions also have allowed recovery when force
was directed toward property interests. This was the case in Ash-
land Dry Goods v. Wages, 87 in which a woman remained in a
store because her purse was being held, and in National Bond In-
vestment Company v. Whithorn,s involving a man who refused
to leave his vehicle as it was being repossessed. Extending false
imprisonment to cover those cases involving threats against legal
82 See Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75
MICH. L. REv. 1621 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 566 comments a-c (1977).
83 See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Gibson, 566 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Ky. 197h;
Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Smith, 136 S.W.2d 759, 767 (Ky. 1940); Great Ad. and
Pac. Tea Co. v. Billups, 69 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1934).
84 National Bond and Inv. Co. v. Whithorn, 123 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky. 1938).
85 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Gibson, 566 S.W.2d at 155.
86 Id. at 166; Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v. Shaffer, 402 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1966).
87 195 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1946).
88 123 S.W.2d at 263. The Court observed:
It is true, as appellant argues, that appellee was at liberty to depart and
these employees were not preventing him from doing so, but the result of his
departure would have been an automatic parting with his automobile,
which he did not desire to part with, and which he did not have to part
with, and which [the defendant] had no right to take over his protests.
Id. at 266.
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interests other than bodily security seems logical since force or
threats against property may just as effectively deprive a person
of liberty against his will. However, linking false imprisonment
to other interests having legal boundaries less settled than bodily
security renders the law of false imprisonment less certain.
Since detention constituting false imprisonment must be
against the plaintiffs will, the consent of the detainee is a com-
plete defense.89 Yielding to a threat of force or to an assertion of
legal authority does not amount to real consent. ° However, an
indirect threat of less immediate consequences is usually not
found to be sufficient to overcome the plaintiffs will. For exam-
ple, the moral pressure or risk of public humiliation involved in
being accused of shoplifting may convince a plaintiff to accom-
pany a merchant to a private place for discussion of the charge.
However, this does not constitute false imprisonment. 91
Questions concerning both consent and threats to property
were raised in Columbia Sussex Corporation, Inc. v. Hay.9 2 Hay
managed a hotel which was the target of an armed robbery. Dur-
ing the robbery, the criminal revealed his knowledge of a special
warning device which could be activated by the removal of cer-
tain bills from the cash register. The officers of Columbia Sussex,
the corporate owner of the hotel, concluded that the criminal
must have been informed of the alarm's presence by one of the
hotel employees. Consequently, they decided to subject each of
the hotel's employees, including Hay, to a polygraph test.
When Hay asked the defendants what would happen if she
refused to take the test, she was told that, although she was free
89 W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 11, at 44; Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v. Shaffer, 402
S.W.2d at 424.
90 W. PROSSER asupra note 8, at § 18.
91 Id. § 11; Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v. Shaffer, 402 S.W.2d at 424; Great AUt.
and Pac. Tea Co. v. Billups, 69 S.W.2d at 5.
KRS § 433.346 (1975) confers on a merchant or his or her employee a privilege to
detain one whom they have probable cause to believe has stolen something. However, the
detention must be done in a "reasonable manner" and for only a "reasonable length of
time." The time limitation has been interpreted to include not only time in which to re-
cover the stolen merchandise, but also time to investigate the facts. See Super-X Drugs of
Kentucky, Inc. v. Rice, 554 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). The merchant has the bur-
den of showing probable cause. Consolidated Sales Co. v. Malone, 530 S.W.2d 680 (Ky.
1975). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 120A (1965).
92 627 S.W. 2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
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to leave, she would forfeit her job as a result. Hay took the test
and, before doing so, signed a form stating that she was under
neither coercion nor duress. Her testimony at trial, however, was
that she signed the form and submitted to the test under duress
inasmuch as her job depended on it.
Hay brought an action against Columbia Sussex and two of
its officers to recover damages for defamation 93 and false im-
prisonment. She was awarded $5,000 compensatory and $7,000
punitive damages on her false imprisonment claim. The defen-
dants appealed the award, however, claiming that a verdict
should have been directed in their favor.4
The Kentucky Court of Appeals identified two elements
necessary to establish an action for false imprisonment: (1) that
the defendants acted with force or threats of force against person
or property, and (2) that the acts intentionally caused the plain-
tiff to be confined to a certain area.95 The "key" element, accord-
ing to the court, is that the restraint be involuntary.96 The court
found that Hay voluntarily took the polygraph examination and,
therefore, was not falsely imprisoned.97
The court based its decision upon two grounds. First, the
signed release stating that she was under no duress or coercion
raised a presumption that her cooperation was voluntary. The
plaintiff was found not to have overcome that presumption be-
cause she was the only one who testified on this issue. 8 The sec-
ond ground was that the plaintiff had not been subjected to force
or threats of force against her person or property, since the court
found Hay's job did not constitute a property interest. Citing the
United States Supreme Court decision in Board of Regents v.
93 The defamation claim is not discussed in this survey as it breaks no new ground in
Kentucky law. The decision does, however, contain an excellent discussion of the state of
defamation law in Kentucky. See generally Mobley, supra note 1.
14 627 S.W.2d at 277.
9' Id. at 278.
96 Id. at 277.97 Id. at 278.
98 Id. The court noted that she could have offered the testimony of the polygraph
examiner, whom she allegedly told of her feelings of duress, or she could have introduced
the response of the polygraph to the answer she gave when asked about the voluntariness
of her consent. Id.
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Roth,19 the court asserted: "Herein, Mrs. Hay did not submit in
order to cleanse her reputation but rather to retain her job. A job
is not a vested property right or interest absent additional consid-
erations such as tenure, contract, etc., none of which was present
here."°°
Finding that threats to Hay's job were insufficient force to
falsely imprison her is consistent with the decisions of the few
other states which have addressed the question. 10 However, the
citation of Board of Regents v. Roth'02 in support of that conclu-
sion is inappropriate. It is true that Roth stated that property
rights in employment are not created by any unilateral desire or
expectation on the part of the employee but rather exist as a re-
sult of a legally identifiable source such as statutes or contracts. 103
However, Roth and its progeny concern the application of proce-
dural due process to dismissals involving state action. 14 They do
not define "property" for the purposes of state common law. In
fact, Roth and subsequent federal cases note that property is de-
fined by reference to state law. 105 Furthermore, post-Roth cases
hold that employees not under contract may still have property
rights in their employment if there is an implied right to con-
tinued employment or a mutual understanding exists between
99 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
'00 627 S.W.2d at 278.
'() See, e.g., Faniel v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 404 A.2d 147, 152 (D.C.
1979) ("fear of losing one's job, although a powerful incentive, does not render involun-
tary the behavior induced"); Moen v. Las Vegas Int'l Hotel, Inc., 521 P.2d 370 (Nev.
1974) (fear of losing job or being prosecuted for theft does not constitute "threat of force").
Cf. Roberts v. Coleman, 365 P.2d 79 (Ore. 1961) (threat of prosecution or humiliation of
employee insufficient).
102 See generally Kallen, The Roth Decision: Does a Non-tenured Teacher Have a
Constitutional Right to a Hearing Before Non-renewal, 61 ILL. B.J. 464 (1973); Com-
ment, "Property" under Due Process-Nontenured Teacher's Right to Re-employment, 27
Sw. LJ. 398 (1973).
103 408 U.S. at 577. For cases applying this interpretation, see Kekai v. Hargrave,
649 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1981); Colm v. Vance, 567 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Ampleman
v. Schlesinger, 534 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1976).
'04 See 408 U.S. at 567, 569-70; Connel v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971);
Dixon v. Wilmington, 514 F. Supp. 250 (D. Del. 1981).
105 See 408 U.S. at 577; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,344 (1976); American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Stetson, 640 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1981); Glenn v. New-
man, 614 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980); Carson v. Russell, 602 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1979); Dixon
v. Wilmington, 514 F. Supp. at 250.
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the parties to that end. 106 The Kentucky Court of Appeals failed
to inquire into whether any such relation existed. 0 7
Although being forced to undergo a polygraph examination
may infringe upon the rights of an employee, an action for false
imprisonment is not the best vehicle to vindicate those rights. An
objection to a polygraph examination, especially if performed
during work hours, is not that the employee does not consent to
be where his or her employer directs, but rather that the em-
ployer is intruding into his or her mind. The interest to be pro-
tected is more in the nature of a right to privacy than a right to
freedom from restraint.
Although courts have not been sympathetic to the rights of
employees regarding polygraph tests, the legislatures of a few
jurisdictions have. Three states, as well as the District of Colum-
bia, now have statutes prohibiting an employer from requiring
that employees or prospective employees undergo polygraph
examinations as a condition of employment.'°8 The resolution of
the issue, therefore, may be found outside of the judicial process.
V. LIMITATIONS
The move to abolish the privity of contract requirement was
slow to reach the area of liability for defective improvements to
real property. However, when the principles of MacPherson v.
106 E.g., Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d at 467 (implied contract); Carson v. Russell,
602 F.2d at 714 (implied rights); Wehner v. Levi, 562 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (mutual
understanding); Kota v. Little, 473 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973) (explicit contractual provision
not necessary); Tyler v. College of William & Mary, 429 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1977) (im-
plied guarantee).
107 It did note, however, that Hay's employment was "terminable at will." See
Northrup v. Kirby, 454 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ala. 1978), which supports the proposition
that there is no property interest in a position terminable at will.
108 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51g (West 1972); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-802 (1981);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 170-90.1 (West 1971). But cf.
Lansburgh's, Inc. v. Ruffin, 372 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C. 1977) (employer has the right to
question employees concerning sales practices). Under each of the statutes, Columbia Sus-
sex would have been subject to penalties despite the written waiver. See State v. Commu-
nity Distrib., Inc., 304 A.2d 213 (N.J. 1973). However, only the District of Columbia stat-
ute expressly provides for a private right of action in the nature of invasion of privacy, not
false imprisonment. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-803 (1981).
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Buick Motor Co. 10 were finally applied to real property in
1957,110 the effect upon the potential liability of architects,
builders and engineers was profound. Not only were such profes-
sionals subjected to the claims of an almost unlimited class of po-
tential claimants, but because their work is embodied in per-
manent structures, they also were subject to liability for an
almost unlimited amount of time. Any person whose presence in
a structure could reasonably be anticipated could sue any time a
latent defect caused an injury."'
In response to pressure from architectural and construction
groups, a majority of state legislatures enacted or amended stat-
utes of limitation to place an absolute limit on the duration of li-
ability for defects in real property. In the period of 1965-67
alone, more than thirty jurisdictions, including Kentucky, passed
such statutes.12 Kentucky's statute appears as Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) section 413.135, subsection (1) of which reads:
No action to recover damages, whether based upon contract or
sounding in tort, resulting from or arising out of any deficiency
in the design, planning, supervision, inspection or construction
of any improvement to real property, or for any injury to prop-
erty either real or personal, arising out of such deficiency, shall
be brought against any person performing or furnishing the de-
sign, planning, supervision, inspection or construction of any
such improvement after the expiration of five years following
the substantial completion of such improvement. "3
09 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). MacPherson held manufacturers liable to remote
users for injuries caused by dangerously defective products despite the absence of any di-
rect contractual relation between the parties.
110 See Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 143 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1957). For a
thorough treatment of MacPherson and Inman and their progeny, see Gouldin, Liability
of Architects and Contractors to Third Persons: Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority
Revisited, 33 INS. COUNSEL J. 361 (1966).
111 Comment, Limitation of Action Statutesfor Architects and Builders-Blueprints
for Non-action, 18 CATH. U. L. REv. 361,362-73 (1969).
12 See generally Comment, Recent Statutory Developments Concerning the Limita-
tions of Actions Against Architects, Engineers and Builders, 60 Ky. L.J. 462 (1971-72).
Kentucky's statute was enacted in 1966. 1966 Ky. Acts ch. 246 (codified as KRS § 413.135
(1972)).
13 KRS § 413.135(1) (1972) (emphasis added). See generally Comment, supra note
112. Other states have statutes limiting actions to as few as four and as many as 12 years.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3-201 to 205 (1980) (four years); IND. CODE §§ 34-4-20-
i to4 (1976) (12 years).
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Statutes such as KRS section 413.135 differ from most stat-
utes of limitation in one crucial aspect. Most statutes begin to run
at the time the cause of action accrues. 114 This is consistent with
the general notion that taking away a potential plaintiffs cause
of action may be justified by undue delay. However, KRS section
413.135 begins upon "substantial completion" of an improve-
ment. "Substantial completion," according to KRS section
413.135(5), "shall be construed to mean the date upon which the
owner of the structure, project, or facility first entered upon the
occupancy or commenced the use thereof."' Therefore, if an in-
jury does not occur until after five years from the date the facility
began to be used, there will be no cause of action for the injury.
The practical effect of KRS section 413.135 is to enable the
.statute of limitations on some action to run before they accrue.
For example, because an action for negligence does not accrue
until damage has been incurred, an injury which occurs as a re-
sult of negligence in the construction of a dwelling five years and
one day after its use began would not be actionable."1 As one
Kentucky decision stated, the statute "perform[s] an abortion on
the right of action . . . before conception."'
1 7
The constitutionality of statutes similar to KRS section
413.135 has been tested on various grounds, including federal
and state due process18 and equal protection" 9 and state constitu-
114 See, e.g., KRS § 413.120 (1972) (contract, trespass, fraud) and KRS § 413.140
(Cum. Supp. 1982) (personal injury, libel).
115 KRS § 413.135(5) (1972).
116 See Lee v. Fister, 413 F.2d 1286,1289 (6th Cir. 1969).
17 Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 224 (Ky. 1973).
118 Most due process challenges have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Burmaster v.
Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1978); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal,
Consulting Eng'rs, 270 N.W.2d 690 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978), afJ'd, 299 N.W.2d 336 (Mich.
1979); Oole v. Oosting, 266 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 299 N.W.2d 336
(Mich. 1979); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976); Howell v. Burk, 568
P.2d 214 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 569 P.2d 413 (N.M. 1977); Hill v. Forrest &
Cotton, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). But see Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 313
So. 2d 518 (Ala. 1975).
119 Equal protection challenges have fared much better than due process ones. The
gist of the equal protection argument is that architects, engineers and builders are no more
deserving of statutory protection from extended liability than are others. Compare Carter
v. Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d at 918 (Ark. 1970) appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971); Bur-
master v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d at 1381; Reeves v. lie Elec. Co., 551
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tional prohibitions against "local or special legislation."' 2 These
actions have met with varying degrees of success. The only
ground of attack discussed by Kentucky courts has been that the
statute operates to deprive potential plaintiffs of the access to
courts guaranteed them by section 14 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion.12'
Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution states: "All courts
shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
process of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay." This section has been interpreted to prohibit the
Kentucky General Assembly from divesting the public of any
common law right to redress injury.' For example, in Ludwig v.
Johnson,120 Kentucky's automobile guest statute was declared un-
constitutional because it impaired the right of injured passengers
to sue negligent drivers.
The initial attack on KRS section 413.135 came in 1973 in
Saylor v. Hall. 24 Saylor was an action against the builder of a
house for his negligence in constructing a fireplace which col-
lapsed fourteen years later. Although the trial court had dis-
missed the claim as barred by the five-year limitation of KRS sec-
tion 413.135, the Court of Appeals held the application of the
statute violated section 14.
The legislature's power to enact statutes of limitation govern-
ing the time in which a cause of action must be brought is, of
P.2d at 647; Howell v. Burk, 568 P.2d at 214; and Hill v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 555
S.W.2d at 145, upholding the statutes with Fujioka v. Kama, 514 P.2d 568 (Hawaii 1973);
Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. 1967); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v.
Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); and Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739 (S.C.
1978), finding the statute to be a violation of equal protection.
120 Compare Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d at 918; and Howell v. Burk, 568
P.2d at 214, (upholding the statute) with Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d at 588 (Ill.
1967), (finding the statute to be "special legislation"). KY. CONST. § 59 prohibits the enact-
ment of local or special laws. However, it has not been used as a ground to attack KRS §
413.135 (1972).
121 Other constructional grounds were raised in Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d at 218.
However, the Court found it unnecessary to address them. Id. at 220.
122 See Kentucky Home Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 93 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1936); Com-
monwealth v. Werner, 280 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1955).
123 49 S.W,2d 347 (1932).
124 497 S.W.2d at 218.
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course, unquestioned. In this state, however, it is equally well
settled that the legislature may not abolish an existing com-
mon-law right of action for personal injuries or wrongful death
caused by negligence.
Surely then, the application of purported limitation statutes in
such manner as to destroy a cause of action before it legally
exists cannot be permissible if it accomplishes destruction of a
constitutionally protected right of action. 121
However, Saylor only held that application of the statute was un-
constitutional in that particular case. It did not hold the statute
to be void. 126
The use of the word "existing" by the court in Saylor was the
basis for the 1982 decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Ball Homes, Inc. v. Volpert. 127 Volpert was an action for dam-
ages for breach of implied warranty and negligence of a builder
who had installed an allegedly defective wiring system in a new
home. A fire caused by the wiring nearly destroyed the house. Al-
though the trial court dismissed the suit as barred by KRS section
413.135, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed. The court,
citing Saylor, found that the statute's effect was unconstitutional
since it deprived the plaintiff of a protected right of action. 1s
The appellant builder argued that the plaintiffs right to
claim breach of implied warranty could not have been infringed
'-5 Id. at 224-25 (emphasis added). Recent decisions from other states holding that
similar statutes violated similar state constitutional provisions include: Overland Constr.
Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (right of access to courts provision violated);
Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975) (right of remedy for
injury provision was not dispositive because equal protection prevailed).
126 497 S.W.2d at 225.
127 633 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1982).
12 Volpert v. Sycamore Estates Co., No. 81-CA-219-MR, slip op. at 11 (Ky. Ct.
App. Sept. 11, 1981), reversed sub nom., Ball Homes, Inc. v. Volpert, 633 S.W.2d 63 (Ky.
1982). The court also found the statutes violated Ky. CONST. § 54. That section prohibits
the General Assembly from limiting the amount of damages recoverable for injuries to
person or property. The court stated:
Under the facts before us, the General Assembly has not attempted through
KRS 413.135 directly to restrict the monetary damages recoverable; how-
ever, if it is held that access to the courts was denied in derogation of Section
14, limitation of damages is an obvious and irrefutable by-product.
No. 81-CA-219-MR, slip op. at 3.
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by section 413.135 since no such cause of action existed at the
time that statute was passed. ' Because the statute was in effect
when a right of implied warranty was first recognized in Ken-
tucky, that right was tempered by the statute from birth rather
than being limited by a subsequent legislative measure. While
granting that the argument might have merit, the court of ap-
peals found it unnecessary to consider it because it found that a
right of implied warranty on real property existed prior to the en-
actment of the statute.,3o
In a short opinion, the Supreme Court reversed.'13 It ac-
cepted the builder's argument that a right of implied warranty
had not existed in regard to real property prior to the enactment
of the statute. Citing Saylor, the Court held that a cause of action
which did not exist when a limitations statute was enacted is not
protected by section 14.132 The Court reasoned that a right not in
existence could not be destroyed by the General Assembly.'3
Therefore, the application of the statute was constitutional.
What is not explained by the Supreme Court's opinion is
what happened to the plaintiff's claim of simple negligence. As
the court of appeals noted, both parties acknowledged that the
complaint related to theories of implied warranty, products li-
ability and tort negligence. Had the Supreme Court discussed the
negligence theory of the action, the result should have been the
same as in Saylor.
The lesson to be learned from Volpert appears to be that one
who wishes to bring an action for defects in real property im-
provements later than five years from the date of its completion
may do so by phrasing the claim in terms of more ancient causes
of action such as negligence, rather than newer theories such as
implied warranty. One must wonder about the wisdom of deter-
mining the scope of constitutional protections based upon the
labeling of an action by attorneys or judges. Although Kentucky
129 Appellants contended that Kentucky first recognized implied warranty in 1969 n
Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969). KRS § 413.135 was enacted in 1966.
1966 Ky. Acts ch. 247.
130 No. 81-CA-219-MR, slip op. at 11.
131 633 S.W.2d at 63.
132 Id. at 64.
13 Id.
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case law interprets section 14 as protecting only those actions
existing at the time the General Assembly acts, the plain lan-
guage of the section reveals an equally valid and broader inter-
pretation. The section reads: "All courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or rep-
utation, shall have remedy ... ." When a statute such as KRS
section 413.135 deprives a potential plaintiff of redress for an in-
jury to a legally recognized interest, it has violated this mandate.
